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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Markets and government planning are providing alternative systems for 
coordinating people’s consumption of resources. The effectiveness of coordination 
depends on the capability of each system to signify accurate information about people’s 
wants and available supplies of resources. And on the incentives each provides for 
individuals to react to the desire of others [Hayek (1945) and Wills (2007)]. Natural 
resources generate public revenues and benefits. Its equitable distribution and sustainable 
production leads to real development and ultimately helped to poverty reduction and 
alleviation. Therefore, natural resource revenues necessitate distributions that favour the 
needs of the indigenous poor people and local sustainable development.  
Productive and high-value natural resources are seldom accessible to all citizens 
and their benefits are rarely evenly dispersed crosswise peoples and geographically 
across nations. It is worth mentioning that revenues collected from natural resources have 
a long history of being mismanaged and misappropriated—with political and economic 
elite often capturing a large share of the benefits while the nations disenfranchised must 
often absorb inexplicably large share of the associated social and environmental 
expenses. These are highly interdependence; a sound environment is crucial to poverty 
reduction and sustainable growth, particularly in low-income countries [IBRD/World 
Bank (2005); World Bank (2006a) and Mustafa (2008)]. 
A clear difference exists between the role of the natural system as a supplier of 
raw material inputs for the economy and a receptor for production and consumption 
residuals. The economy has been divided into two broad segments, producer and 
consumers. There is a need to develop balance between these two segments i.e. in the 
long run all materials taken by human beings out of natural system must eventually 
end up back in that system. This means that to reduce residuals flows into 
environment we must also effectively and efficiently produce and utilise materials 
taken from the ecosystem.   
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Unfortunately, over the time there is over exploitation of nature resources and 
misbalance of producers and consumer segments. This resulted in ambient environmental 
quality degradation, damages, and unbridled growth and development all over the world. 
It has laid a heavy burden of sustainability on the present and foreseeable future on our 
planet.  The consequences are in the form of environmental degradation, social inequity, 
and poverty. These are highly interdependence; a sound environment is crucial to poverty 
reduction and sustainable growth, particularly in low-income countries [IBRD/World 
Bank (2005)].  
Sustainable development is, therefore, the cumbersome of all considerations by 
international community as well national governments. There has been a commitment to 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) including integration the principles of 
sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of 
environmental course, also, including the overarching target of halving extreme poverty 
by the year 2015 from the level of 1990. The World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) on South Africa in 2002 affirmed the MDGs, but also stressed the way that 
improved environmental management could help to reduce poverty.   
The government of Pakistan is committed to pursue MDGs targets, well aware of 
the consequences of the environment degradation and has made diligent progress in the 
institutional strengthening and capacity building of policy and planning institutions, 
environmental awareness, and the promulgation of environmental legislation, National 
Environment Quality Standards (NEQS), and establishment of environmental tribunals. 
The National Conservation Strategy in 1992 and National Environment Policy were 
prepared during 2005. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was also prepared. 
The Medium Term Development Framework 2005-10 (MTDF) carries these assurances 
forward [Pakistan (2005)]. The vision 2030 is also drafted where the vision for 
environment conservation and management aims for equitable sharing of environmental 
benefits, increasing community management of national resources, and integrating 
environmental issues into socio-economic planning to achieve sustainable development. 
The action agenda would cover both the brown and the green environment, range 
management, desertification, and marine pollution [Pakistan (2007)]. 
Despite government efforts in environment planning and policy-making, the issue 
of environment degradation is not managed. The urgency of addressing Pakistan’s 
environmental problems has never been greater, not just because of the intrinsic virtues of 
promoting responsible environmental stewardship, but also because of economic 
consequences of environmental degradation. Conservative estimates revealed that the 
annual cost of environmental degradation is approximately six percent of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), the costs are of a similar magnitude to the 2006 growth performance 
recorded in the National Account [World Bank (2006a) and Pakistan (2006)].  
In the aggravated, aggregated, alarming environmental and natural resource 
degradation situation and its soaring cost to the society as well on national exchequer. It 
is vital to generate and utilise the scare available budget wisely at all tiers of government. 
The budget should be the financial mirror of society’s economic, social, and political 
wills and choices. The government is a representative of people and in order to execute 
its role, state needs to collect revenue from the economy in sufficient and appropriate 
manner and distribute and utilise those resources responsively, efficiently and effectively. 
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The collection as well distribution of resources is the key instrument of government 
policy. Which have the integral relationship between revenue and expenditure i.e. money 
collected (taxes) directly or indirectly from the public and the use of that money for 
sustainable development, prosperity, poverty alleviation and well being of its people at all 
regional, provincial, and districts levels.  
Therefore, it is pivotal to understand fiscal collection particularly from natural 
resources, its distribution and effects on sustainable development and poverty eradication. 
The objectives of the study are to highlight and analysed the environmental situation, 
environmental fiscal reforms, decentralisation and their relationship between sustainable 
development and poverty. The study also described the situation of environment, 
decentralisations and poverty in district Abbottabad of NWFP as a case study.  
The study is divided into four sections. After the first introduction “The economy 
and environment” links is descried in the second one. The economy is mainly divided in 
to consumers and producers both get the inputs from natural environment and discharge 
residuals. The excess non-decomposed residual creates environmental problems. These 
residuals disturbed the natural balance in the inputs and residuals discharged back into 
the environment. In the third section Environmental Fiscal Reforms (EFR), 
decentralisation for sustainability and poverty alleviation are discussed. There is a close 
relation ship between environment degradation; sustainability and poverty, which is 
discussed in section three. In order to cope with the situation EFR can play positive role, 
this is also highlighted in this section. The last section covered the summary and 
conclusion.     
2.  THE ECONOMY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
The economy is a set of technological, legal, and social arrangements through 
which group of people seek to enhance their material and spiritual standards of life. 
Encompassing the natural environment, any economic system as discussed in basic 
economic literature has the elementary functions of production, distribution, and 
consumption. We can broadly divide the economy in to “Producers” and 
“Consumers” segments. The “Producer” category includes all the firms, public as 
well private organisations and services that use inputs and convert them into outputs. 
All good and services are derived from inputs includes raw material drawn from the 
natural resources i.e. fuels, minerals, wood, petroleum, water, gases, etc. There are 
also materials utilised by consumers directly from the nature i.e. pumping of water, 
fuel wood, etc. 
Production and consumption process generate “residuals” which are leftover. It 
includes all type of materials residuals which is omitted into air or water or disposed on 
land i.e. SO2, CO2, volatile organic compounds, toxic solvents, pesticides, toxic 
chemicals, solid and liquid waste, heavy metals, waste energy in the form of heat and 
noise, and radioactivity, etc. Some of the residuals are recycled while a large amount of 
residuals due to mismanagement creates pollution and environmental degradation. 
Material and energy being extracted from the natural environment and residuals are 
discharged back into the environment (Figure 1). For sustainability in the long run, these 
two flows (producers and consumers) must be equal which the first law of 






p RRM … … … … … … … (1)  
Where:  
M = Raw material  
d
pR = Residual discharge from production   
d
cR = Residual discharge from consumption 
The fundamental material balance equation must hold in the long run. If we desire 
to reduce the mass of residuals disposed of in the natural environment, we must reduce 
the quantity of raw materials taken into the system and increase recycle material for 
producers and consumers. In Equation (1) we substitute for M (Figure 1): 
d
pR  + 
d




cR … … … … (2) 
Where:  
G = Output (Good)  
Rp  = Production residuals  
Rc  = Consumption residuals  
r
pR = Recycle from producers  
r
cR = Recycle from consumers 
There is need to reduce M, Rc and Rp while increasing rpR and 
r
cR in the Equation (2) for 
sustainability.   
Fig. 1.  The Environment and the Economy 
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The material we extracted from the natural environment should be equal to the 
goods and services produced and recycled residuals. These environmental goods and 
services have a limit to their bearing capacity, beyond which they cannot sustain their 
use.  
Crowding on their use can decrease users utility and generate more leftover 
residuals that are not recycled and reused generate environment pollution and 
degradation. Over the time there is increase in the residuals and pollution, which creates 
serious environmental problems. It is worth wise to mention that each user values but 
none of them has an incentive to pay to sustain them. The unconsumed residual creates 
externalities, which badly affect living thing including human being, nature and real 
growth of the economy. The present market mechanism often failed to regulate their 
production, consumption, and allocation. In order to understand the situation it is 
imperative to estimate their opportunity costs.  The cost to the society can then be forced 
to the polluters. The polluter must bear the price. This will helped to evaluate and 
regulate environmental impacts and ensured environmentally sustainable economic 
growth. There is a trade-off between environmental quality and economic goods. An 
increase of 0.3 percent investment in household access to safe drinking water generates 
one percent increase in GDP. Whereas, provision of safe drinking water supply is an 
effective health intervention reduces the morality caused by water-borne diseases by an 
average 70 percent. Inadequate drinking water not only resulted in more sickness and 
deaths, but also augments health costs, lower worker productivity and school enrolment 
[World Bank (1994)]. In Pakistan the  highest annual losses reported is due to water 
supply, sanitation and hygiene amounting Rs 112 billion amounting 31percent of the loss 
due to environment degradation [World Bank (2006a)]. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimate 1.8 million people in developing 
countries die every year from diarrhea and cholera, Out of these 90 percent are children 
under the age of five years. While 88 percent of diarrhoeal diseases are attributed to 
unsafe water supply, inadequate sanitation and hygiene [WHO (2004)]. The situation is 
not very different in Pakistan; the access to safe drinking water is estimated to be 
available to 23.5 percent of population in rural areas and 30 percent in urban areas. While 
every year 0.2 million children die due to diarrheal diseases [Rosemann (2005)].   
The annual presage estimated cost of environmental and natural resource 
degradation and damage is about Rs 365 billion which is one billion rupees per day or six 
percent of GDP. These estimated are based on those parameters for which reasonable 
estimates are available. The highest cost is from inadequate water supply, sanitation, and 
hygiene (Rs 112 billion) followed by agricultural soil degradation (Rs 70 billion), and 
indoor air pollution (Rs 67 billion). Urban air pollution (particular matter) adds another 
Rs 65 billion. The estimated cost of lead exposure is about Rs 45 billion. Rangeland 
degradation and deforestation cost are the lowest at about Rs 7 billion in total (Figure 2). 
Due to the lack of available data, estimates are on lower sides and even misleading. A 
number of categories i.e. fisheries and coastal zone degradation were not included in 
these estimates, as a consequences calculations of the relative share of damage must be 
interpreted with the utmost caution since the magnitude of total damages is unknown 




Fig. 2. Annual Losses Due to Environmental Degradation 
Water supply, sanitation 
and hygine, Rs 112 (b), 
31%
Agricultural soil degradation, 
Rs 70 (b), 19 %
Indoor air pollution, Rs 67 
(b), 18 %
Urban air pollution,
Rs 45 (b), 12%
Range land and 
defortation Rs 7 
(b), 2%     
Other , Rs 64 (b), 
18%
Source:  World Bank  (2006a).  
3. ENVIRONMENTAL FISCAL REFORMS, DECENTRALISATION, 
SUSTAINABILITY, AND POVERTY 
As discussed earlier the present market mechanism cannot often make 
fundamental material balance in Equation 2 (Section 2) which must hold in the long run, 
other wise grave environmental problem arises. It is pivotal to take a collective action for 
their upkeep, which incurs considerable public cost.  
It is well documented and argued that there is a close relationship between poverty 
and environment. Natural resources are the important component of livelihood for the 
poor people. Over the time due to mismanagement natural resources are in declining 
trend and are very much degraded and polluted. It resulted dual problem firstly their 
availability is declined, secondly due to degradation and pollution, some basic amenities 
such as safe drinking water and clean air is not available. This created serious socio, 
economics and health problems especially for the poor segment of the population. It 
increases expenditure and decreases the efficiency of a person. All these resulted in 
increasing the poverty. These issues can be tackled by improved pricing of environmental 
goods and services in such a way that these become poor friendly. The polluter must pay 
the price and the affective must be compensated.  
3.1. Environmental Fiscal Reforms  
There is no free lunch. Polluters are creating negative externalities which are not 
born by them while the society is paying this cost. The cost of these measures should be 
reflected in the cost of goods and services, which causes pollution in production and or 
consumption. Polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out those measures decided 
by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in adequate state. The resources 
generated should be used to facilitate or support the environmentally friendly measures.  
EFR refer measures that rationalise tax arrangement in such a way so that it 
establish linkages between an effective and efficient fiscal and decentralisation system, 
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resulting in decrease of natural resource degradation, pollution and ultimately 
environmental improvement and sustainable development. A sympathetically designed 
and implemented EFR can also reduce poverty, improve poor people’s access to 
environmental services, liberate finances for poor friendly investments and address 
environmental problems that affect the poor e.g. subsidy reforms and taxes that change 
the prices of natural resources (e.g. water, forests, and fisheries) or of products with high 
environmental externalities (e.g. fuel and electricity) would help in raising the sustainable 
growth rate and the incomes of the poor (Figure 3).  
The context for EFR is at the line between fiscal issues, decentralisations, 
poverty and environmental challenges facing the country. The essence is efficient 
utilisation of natural resources. The natural resources exploiter and polluter should be 
taxed, fined and discouraged [OECD (2005); IBRD/World Bank (2006a); 
IUCN/PIDE (2006)].  
It is essential to ascertain effective and efficient revenue system, which faces 
some alarming challenges. In Pakistan, there is a large share of indirect taxes (about 
70 percent) mainly from custom sale and central excise duties. Pakistan over the last 
decade has made some significant strides in fiscal reforms with positive 
environmental impact, primarily motivated by the fiscal crisis of financially 
unsustainable subsidies. Recent reforms include changes in electricity tariff rates and 
improved collection, pilot examples of more effective collection of irrigation costs 
and more market based fuel prices. These form an important basis for further reform 
[Pakistan (2006)].    
Fig. 3. EFR Benefits    
Poverty Reduction  
Improving environmental quality e.g. better natural resource management or 
provision of environmental infrastructure:  
Poor depend on environment for health, livelihoods and vulnerability 
Fiscal revenues: revenues for pro-poor expenditure on health, education 
et 
Protection or compensation to protect poor from price rises  
Environmental Benefits  
Incentives for sustainable NR 
management 
Incentives for curbing 
pollution (air, water, soil) 
Funds for environment 
agencies and investments 
Fiscal Benefits  
Revenue mobilisation 
Reduced distortions 
Reduced drains on public 
finances   
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Carefully planned, designed and implemented EFR can play very significant and 
important role in poverty reduction through improving access to environmental services 
for the poor segment of the population in such a way that addressing environmental 
issues that create negative influence on them. EFR action will free resources that can be 
used for pro-poor investment. Adopting EFR ensured achieving multiple fiscal, poverty 
and environmental objectives, there are potential trade-offs. These objectives can be 
addressed by appropriate design of the fiscal measure including the correct price level, 
rationalisation of subsidies and the tax structures, and the distribution and quality of 
public expenditure.  It has the potential to be pro-poor, if the poor who depend on natural 
resources for survival have access to better facilities as the resources are generated. If the 
incidence of user fees and product charges are regressive, i.e. an increase in the price of 
goods that account for a higher percentage of poor people’s expenditure, or 
environmental improvements benefit mainly the rich, the tax structure and incidence of 
public expenditure need be made progressive [IUCN/PIDE (2006) and Rao (1996)]. 
The important of EFR in the decentralisation perspective is further highlighted 
because by involving local communities and stakeholders, would pay more attention and 
involvement for the effective and efficient fiscal policies in the district. The addition 
funds generated could be used for improving access to safe water, sanitation and other 
basic and civic amenities for the poor, which can be used for poverty reduction. Some of 
the EFR options that have been identified during a background study conducted for 
IUCN/PIDE research proposal are presented in Table 1. These options have been chosen 
to maximise positive outcomes, and to lead to win-win situations across the board. They 
reflect the impacts of EFR in terms of high fiscal benefits, high poverty reduction 
benefits, high environmental benefits and high political viability [IUCN/PIDE (2006)].     
3.2. Fiscal Decentralisation 
Fiscal Decentralisation comprises the financial aspects of devolution to regional and 
local government. Decentralisation can introduce a sense of popular ownership of government 
and bring about direct benefits like to enhanced efficiency of public goods provision, quality 
of government through democratic accountability and economic growth [Oates (1993) and 
WBI (2007)]. The pursuit of decentralisation is widespread in all part of the world for 
developed countries it is reorganisation of the government in order to provide public goods 
and services cost effectively in the “post-welfare state” era. For developing countries is to 
escape from the traps of ineffective and inefficient governance, macroeconomic instability, 
and inadequate economic growth. In the developing countries political pressure is also 
emerging from the people for democratisation. While for transitional countries it is a transition 
from system to market economy and democracy. 
There is a continuous debate in the literature of fiscal decentralisation about its 
desirability, the positive side revelled that in general the public sector reforms are 
ineffective and inefficient governance. There is irresponsive to the people needs and it 
has inter-jurisdictional and interpersonal inequality. While fiscal decentralisation 
increases efficiency, transparency and accountability, which bring economic stability, 
sustainable growth and better public service provision with equitability across people and 
jurisdiction [Akai and Sakata (2002); Brueckner (2006) and WBI (2007)].  This is 
illustrated at Figure 4. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Benefits and Political Viability of Different  
Environmental Fiscal Instruments 




Benefits Political Viability 
Reform of abiana 
charges  
High – huge cost of 
irrigation will be 
financed 
Mixed – but can be 
high if leads to greater 
water reliability 
Medium – depending 
on impact on water 
use 
Medium – more likely 
if linked to strong 
farmers organisations 




High – huge cost to 
Provincial 
governments would be 
saved 
Mixed in short term, 
but high in medium 
term if slows fall in 
water tables 
High – if slows fall in 
water tables 
Medium – crisis 
situation in 
Balochistan has 
created climate for 
change 
Reform of License 
fees and catch levies 
for foreign vessels 
Mixed – rise in fees 
could increase 
revenues, but ban on 
foreign vessels could 
end revenue 
High  – poor 
enforcement has led to 
clashes with poor 
fishers 
High – reduction in 
licensed  foreign 
vessels may be needed 
to allow fish stocks to 
recovery 
High – pressure from 
small fishers has led 
Provinces to oppose 
current federal license 
policy 
Fiscal measures for 
Pakistani vessels 
Low – little revenue 
generated 
Low – conflicts over 
fish access between 
Sindh  and 
Balochistan  
Medium – aim to  
reduce over-fishing in 
Balochistan 
Medium – problem of 
enforcement 
Reform of proposed 
shrimp farming 
subsidies  
Low – subsidies not 
significant  
High – unplanned 
shrimp development 
had negatively 
impacted the poor in 
many Asian countries 
High – unplanned 
shrimp farming has  
negatively impacted 
environment in many 
Asian countries 
Medium – as yet no 
industry to push for 
subsidies 
Improved collection 
and distribution of 
timber concessions 
fees 
High in NWFP, where 
forests are located 
High - current evasion  
deprives rural 
households of revenue
High – if leads to 
reduced logging 
Low/Medium – as 
timber mafia is 
entrenched 
National park entrance 
fees with higher 
charges for foreigners 
Low–- as visitation, 
especially by 
foreigners is low 
Medium – if funds 
properly used for 
poverty alleviation 
High – if funds used 
for biodiversity 
management 
High – not 
controversial 
Trophy hunting fees Low – but can be 
important to certain 
households 
Medium – if funds 
properly used for 
poverty alleviation 
High – schemes have 
increased wild 
populations 
High – not 
controversial 
Water user charges Medium – can be 
costly for local govt  
and non-payment by 
some households 
Mixed –requires 
careful design to 
ensure better access 
by poor households 
Low – impacts on 
water scarcity low  
Mixed – requires 
careful design 
Fuel pricing Low – fuel is already 
heavily taxed, except  
CNG which is 
subsidised  
Mixed – high prices 
can generate inflation 
High – fuel use linked 
to indoor and outdoor 
air pollution 
Low – prices already 
high 
Motor vehicles – 
vehicle excise duty  
Low – but could be 
useful for local govt 
Medium – poor do not 
own vehicles 
High – motor vehicles 
are rising fast 
High – reforming 
excise to reflect 
environment not 
controversial 
Electricity – improved 
collection of rates 
High – major non-
payment of electricity 
Mixed – requires 
careful design to 
improve access by 
poor households 
Medium – linked to 
air pollution 
Medium – requires 
willingness to take 
action against non 
payment 
Solid waste user 
charges 
Low – but could be 
useful for local govt 
Medium – if improves 
service 
High – major source 




Low – as currently 
very little is spent  
High – poor suffer 
from dirty water 
High – major source 
of pollution 
Medium – requires 
industry to pay 
Source:  IUCN/PIDE (2006). 
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Fig. 4.  Fiscal Decentralisation (FD)  
While the other group disputed on it and argue that it inherently destabilise the 
economy, there is no significant relationship between fiscal decentralisation and public 
sector size. Even it associated with slower growth [Oates (1993); Thornton (2007); Xie, 
Zou, and Davoodi (1999); Zhang and Zou (1998)]. The definition and implementation of 
fiscal decentralisation vary greatly across developing countries due to different in 
economic and political composition.  
3.3. Sustainability and Poverty  
In Pakistan the macroeconomic results of the country over the last five years 
are very impressive. The average growth rate was accelerated from 3.3 percent in 
1997-2002 to over 6.5 percent during 2002-06. Despite these attainments, social and 
natural resource indicators continue to exhibit the discouraging developing 
challenges face the country. The trickle down theory has been badly failed. There is 
an importance to strengthen environmental management, to reduce risks to health and 
natural resource productivity, and to sustain economic growth [Pakistan (2006) and 
World Bank (2006)].  
A range of mechanisms has been used to promote distributional equity of natural 
resource benefits. These include inexplicably taxing regions and people with natural 
resource affluence (e.g., progressively structured taxation policies) and distributing state 
natural resource revenues in ways that favour the poor (e.g., equalisation grants that 
recognise various human development and social well-being measures). Like Pakistan in 
many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the rural poor are more directly 
dependent on natural resources than rich people for their livelihood. Without 
distributional equity, regions and people with access to productive natural resources may 
flourish while those with no or limited access to such natural resources or with access to 
only low-value natural resources will remain worse off. There is a necessary need to 
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harness environmental management, to reduce risks to health and natural resource 
productivity, dismantle poverty, and to sustain economic growth [Pakistan (2006) and 
World Bank (2006, 2007)].  
There is a positive relationship between poverty and environmental 
degradation as already discussed earlier, often in a self-perpetuating negative spiral 
in which poverty accelerates environmental degradation and degradation results in or 
exacerbates poverty. In Pakistan as of other countries environment degradation is 
both a cause and consequence of poverty. A fragile and poor resource base is one of 
the major reason of poverty because it resulted in poor agricultural 
yield/productivity, forest are depleted decreased livelihood opportunities. Food 
requirements are always stood first as of environment issues. Poor people have to fill 
their bally in order to survive. The environment concerns are ignored resulting in 
further degradation of resources. The vicious circle of poverty and environment 
degradation emerged. For example water and air pollution causes illness and 
premature mortality. Which resulted resources for treatment, also reduces working 
efficiencies, and lead to higher poverty [World Bank (2006, 2007)]. United Nations 
Summits on Financing for Development and on Sustainability Development in March 
and September 2002 respectively, recognised the potential contribution of EFR 
related approach. The latter stressed that poverty reduction and improved 
environmental management go hand-in-hand [IBRD/World Bank (2006)]. 
There are two type of distributional equity of natural resource benefits, which 
includes inter-jurisdictional equity (equity across districts within a nation) and intra-
jurisdictional equity (equity across peoples and communities within levels of public 
administration below the central government). In this connection, additional research is 
required, policy analysts and development professionals argue that inter-jurisdictional 
equity (for broad national development) can be consummate only by central government 
and, therefore, is a function of the compliance of the central state to employ in 
redistribution among regions. It require central government providing public revenues, 
goods, and services directly to the poor, or allocating revenues and other goods and 
services to local governments with poor constituents and poor natural resource 
endowments. 
While the intra-jurisdictional distribution of government goods and services and 
the equity of local government decisions is often a function of decentralisation. 
Decentralisation provides more equitable distribution in local districts, greater 
opportunities for empowering and serving the poorest people, and, as a result, better 
supports poverty reduction. There is some evidence that local authorities are better than 
central authorities at identifying and reaching the poor and that they incorporate 
distributional preferences into choices on spending decisions. It is unclear whether this is 
common practice.  
It is well recognised and advocated that without community involvement and 
participation, development initiatives either in economic or social sector, have little 
change of success, especially at the grassroots level [Mustafa (1998, 2000); Mustafa and 
Mir (1999) and UNDP (2005)]. With the concept of “conservation”, especially in the 
government circle, now also take into account “community participation” and poverty 
alleviation. Recent research concludes that responsiveness to the poor is, in fact, a rare 
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outcome of decentralisation, dogged mainly by local-central government relations. Strong 
commitments by national governments or ruling parties to promote the interests of the 
poor at the local level resulted in positive outcomes.  
The vital role of national governments in both inter-jurisdictional and intra-
jurisdictional equity is obvious. It required a pragmatic approach to embark upon the 
challenges. It is imperative to extend fiscal policy in such a manner, which mobilises 
revenue to basic ammonites of life, infrastructure, and environment. This is the area 
where EFR can play an essential role. Fiscal policy encompasses various elementary 
strategically issues; including the proper role and size of the state, the role of the 
Government in promoting growth, creating jobs, social development and redistribution of 
benefits of economic growth, the nature and extent of public services and fairness 
between the present and future generation.   
3.4.  Fiscal Decentralisation Issues, Constraints, and Opportunities:  
        A Scenario Analysis of Abbottabad, NWFP 
For the scenario analysis of decentralisation Abbottabad district of NWFP has 
been selected. The district has prepared “State of the Environment and Development” 
and “An Integrated Development Vision” during 2004 [IUCN (2004a, 2004b)]. 
Pakistan is a federation comprising four provinces, Federal Administrated Tribal 
Areas (FATA) and Federal Capital Areas. Most of the revenue is collected by centre 
and it is distributed vertically and horizontally to provinces and districts through 
systematic and random formula base. National Finance Commission (NFC), 
Provincial Finance Commission (PFC), Federal to Local and Local-to-Local 
distribution resources are based on systematic formula. While the 
development/special grants, executives discretionary, parliamentarian funds, etc. falls 
under random transaction. 
Federal government provides resources to provinces and other areas in the 
form of revenue shares, grants, straight transfers and loans, while it collect revenues 
in the form of income tax, sales tax, custom duties, and excise duties. Whereas, the 
provinces collect their revenues in the form of minor tax assignments i.e. agriculture 
tax, stamp duties, motor vehicle tax, etc. and others which are levied and retained by 
them. The district government has the responsibilities for the construction and 
running/maintenance of district roads, education, water supply and health services, 
while sewers/sanitation and fire services are managed by Tehsil level. Parks/play 
grounds, animals, cultural and support activities and street lights are administered by 
Union Councils. 
The federal government (FG) generates about 91 percent resources, whereas, the 
rest is produced by provinces and local governments. The expenditure share is 67.1, 28.8 
and 4.1 percent amongst the federal, provincial and local government level in the overall 
national exchequer, respectively. The FG is in surplus of around 24 while the provincial 
governments are in deficit of 23.3 percent. While, local governments were unable to 
utilised 0.3 percent of revenue share and returned it due to administrative and other issues 
(Table 2). 
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Table 2 
Percentage Share of Public Finance Layout across the Tiers of the Government 
Tier of Government Revenue Share Expenditure Share Surplus/Deficit 
National  90.7 67.1 23.6 
Provincial 4.9 28.8 –23.9 
Local 4.4 4.1 0.3 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan.  
With the passage of time, FG has overstressed itself into several matters that are 
purely the subject of lower tiers mainly due to political reasons. The sole criterion for 
NFC award is population. Allocations of the awards are based on politics. There is an 
increase in the overall pie of resources because there is an augment in the generation of 
resources but its overtime-proportional distribution remains the same. The provincial 
proportional share of NWFP awards is even decreased. The NWFP government 
complains getting fewer shares of royalties from the FG, mainly because the provincial 
government has different political background. The special development funds/grants, 
random transfers are under the direct control of Prime Minister, President, Chief 
Minister, and or Governor and they disbursed resources on political basis. Some times a 
particular district gets even much higher resources than the allotted one. 
The NWFP Finance Commission is based on weight of 50, 25 and 25 percent on 
population, backwardness (based on multiple indicator cluster survey i.e. income, 
drinking water, education and literacy, child survival and nutrition, immunisation and EPI 
with equal weight), and lag in infrastructure (LII). In the provincial financial award there 
is astounding distribution of resources. NWFP has 24 districts amongst these Peshawar 
district is getting the highest share (2.10 percent) of LII while 0.5 and 0.94 percent share 
were allocated to “Tank” and  “Abbottabad” districts, respectively. In case of 
backwardness and LII still “Peshawar” district got the highest share (2.78 percent), while 
“Chitral” had the lowest (1.27 percent) and “Abbottabad” had 1.5 percent. 
Fiscal decentralisation has brought into sharp focus the inequitable geographical 
distribution of funds. The financial position of every District is although clearly 
indicated, and this will allow the Nazims to politically defend the interests of their 
Districts at a time when the Provincial Finance Commission determines allocations. This 
was supposed to makes transparent the Provincial share of the total budget as compared 
to the Districts but in a political system it becomes very difficult to Nazims from same as 
well from different political parties to differ and stand for the district cause.  
Public finances in Pakistan have been characterised by high fiscal deficits, poor 
revenue mobilisation, a persistent trend of centralisation, massive vertical imbalances 
between federal and provincial governments (i.e. very large gaps between provincial 
governments’ expenditures and own revenues, which have to be made up by means of 
fiscal transfers from the FG), weak financial management and lack of accountability of 
the public sector.  The federal government has better sources of taxes as of provincial and 
local governments (Table 3). 
Local governments (LG) have not been recognised by the constitution as a 
separate tier of government and existed only as extensions of the provinces with some 




Revenue Assignments among Federal and Provincial Government 
Governments Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes 
Income Tax Sales Tax 
Excise Duty Corporation Tax 
Custom duty 
Wealth Tax Import Duty 
Property Tax Export Duty   
Gas and Petroleum Surcharge 
Federal 
Government   
Foreign Travel Tax 
Land Revenue  Stamp duty 
Urban Immovable property tax Motor vehicle tax 
Tax on transfer of property  Entertainment tax 
Agricultural income tax Electricity duty 
Provincial 
Government 
Tax on professions and trades   
Source:  World Bank ( 2006b).       
structure and related distribution of authority for revenue mobilisation and expenditure 
obligations among different levels of government. The LG Plan 2000 recognises the 
problems associated with the system by stating that “the transfer and grant system has 
been weak. There is no formula for distribution of funds to districts and provincial 
budgets do not specify district expenditures. Districts do not know, with certainty, what 
they will expect from the provincial departments, which affects planning negatively. This 
results in political machinations, ad-hocism, and lack of transparency.  
Along with the fiscal decentralisation issues, Pakistan is facing numerous 
challenges in the area of halting and reversing the environment degradation. There are 
efficiency related issues, which are about capacity and knowledge, equity related 
concerns, which relate with distribution of resources, while effectiveness problems, 
which relate with the direction and guidance. These limit the rate of success of initiatives 
for pollution control and environmental protection and management. 
The general view of the people is that TMA is unable to tap additional sources of 
revenue because the tax base is small and taxpayers are not willing to pay more (Table 3).  
It needs further investigation. The amount released by NWFP Government to district 
Abbottabad during 2005-06 is presented at Table 4. The major heads are salary and non 
salary (other and electricity), development funds and Zila tax. The Abbottabad 
cantonment budget is released by the Provincial Government but managed and regulated 
by Cantonment. It is worth mentioning that it is three times as of rest of the district. More 
than 91 percent of the district budget is for salary purposes while little more than two 
percent of district budget is allocated as development fund (Rs 27 million).  
Abbottabad administration attempted to increase tax base but could not make it. 
Only Rs 25, 42,000 fund were generated from local resources i.e. health, education, C&T, 
and mutation during 2005-06 by the Abbottabad District revenue department, while one 
MNA has 10 millions funds for his constituency. In general, establishment costs 
(expenditures on salaries and overheads) have increased faster than provincial government 
transfer to LG through provincial Finance Commission awards. This resulted in lower 
allocation of resources to development projects than the overall increase in the revenue.  
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Table 4 







Funds Zila Tax 
Cantonment 
Board 
July 90.652 11.468* 6.192* 6.798* 0.552 334.1 
Aujust 90.652    0.552 334.1 
Sept. 90.652    0.552 334.1 
October 90.652 11.468* 6.192* 6.798* 0.552 334.1 
November. 90.652    0.552 334.1 
December. 90.652    0.552 334.1 
January 90.652 11.468* 6.192* 6.798* 0.552 334.1 
Febuary 90.652    0.552 334.1 
March 90.652    0.552 334.1 
April 90.652 11.468* 6.192* 6.798* 0.552 334.1 
May 90.652    0.552 334.1 
June 90.652    0.552 334.1 
Total 1087.820 45.873 24.768 27.192 6.948 4009.1 
Source: NWFP Finance Department. 
          * Quarter.   
4.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Poverty and environment degradation are the serious peril in the country. Its 
causes and affects are highly dependent upon the distribution of resources. Public 
revenue and benefits are primarily generated through natural resources and their equitable 
distribution can promote sustainable development and fairness in the country. The 
benefits from the production of high value natural resources are generally mismanaged 
and seldom accessible to the indigenous and all citizens; their payback is rarely dispersed 
evenly among people and geographically across nations, resulting in environmental 
degradation. The major causes of most of the wars are the control and exploitation of 
natural resources (NR). There is a vicious cycle of poverty and environment degradation. 
Environment degradation is a cause as well as a consequence of poverty and walks off 
hand-in-hands. 
‘Environment Fiscal Reforms’ (EFR) refers to fiscal measures that rationalise tax 
arrangement, resulting in reduction of NR degradation, pollution and ultimately 
environmental improvement and sustainable development. EFR can generate benefits in 
terms of fiscal revenue, environmental outcomes and poverty reduction.  Decentralisation 
of resources provides an equitable distribution in local districts, greater opportunities for 
empowering and serving the poorest people, and, as a result, better supports the poverty 
reduction. The study undertakes the preliminary collation of research on fiscal 
decentralisation issues, constraints and opportunities. And its links to EFR initiative for 
district Abbottabad, NWFP, Pakistan. 
Fiscal Decentralisation comprises the financial aspects of devolution to regional 
and local government. Decentralisation can introduce a sense of popular ownership of 
government and bring about direct benefits like to enhanced efficiency of public goods 
provision, quality of government through democratic accountability and economic 
growth. 
EFR and Fiscal decentralisation can lay down the structure of expenditures, 
revenues and legal discretion within which provincial and local governments can operate 
Usman Mustafa 1102
 
in an effective, efficient, accountable, equitable, and transparent way. People are 
demanding greater self-determination and influence in the decisions of their 
governments. Fiscal decentralisation is inevitably a dynamic process. The devolution of 
power and decentralisation of resources offers many opportunities in the shape of hopes 
for empowerment of people and resolution of their local problems at local levels. The 
system is receiving unprecedented support from international partners and other 
stakeholders as well. But at the same time, the system is at risk due to political reasons 
and troublesome constitutional position.  
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